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Rock Island Revisited: Black Hawk’s Life, 




In 1848 American newspapers announced the 
death of Keokuk, a tribal leader of the Sauk Nation who had established 
a reputation as one of the finest American Indian orators. The Ameri-
can painter George Catlin had painted his portrait several times and 
found that  there was “no Indian chief on the frontier better known at this 
time, or more highly appreciated for his eloquence.”1 Historians, too, fre-
quently praised Keokuk’s skills as a politician and orator: Caleb Atwa-
ter called him “a shrewd politic man, as well as a brave one,” Benjamin 
Drake celebrated his “eloquence” and “sagacity,” and Thomas McKenney 
commented on his “courage, prudence, and eloquence.” Keokuk was, in 
McKenney’s words, “in all re spects, a magnificent savage.”2 Of course, 
good reputations have a way of eroding, and more than a  century  later 
the historian Donald Jackson described Keokuk more skeptically as a 
“smooth talker and a politician” who had aimed “to co- exist with the 
Americans.” By contrast, the Sauk warrior Black Hawk— who challenged 
Keokuk’s status as civil chief and mounted an impor tant campaign of 
re sis tance against the United States— stood out as a “bull- headed fighter 
who chose a  bitter last stand against extinction.”3 In critical commen-
tary Black Hawk and Keokuk typically pres ent a clear opposition. As 
Thomas Burnell Colbert notes, while Black Hawk is remembered as “a 
noble Native American leader trying to save his culture,” Keokuk is 
 typically dismissed as “a self- seeking sycophant” to the American 
government.4 
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Such appraisals undoubtedly have historical roots. At the conclusion 
of the Black Hawk War in 1832,  after settler volunteers had decimated 
Black Hawk’s band of followers, the American government reaffirmed 
Keokuk as the official liaison between the United States government and 
the confederated Sauk and Meskwaki nations.5 This appointment re-
warded him for having tried to keep peace with the settler population 
flooding into the Mississippi River Valley, and for signing off on land ces-
sions in exchange for annuities. By the time Black Hawk’s conflict with 
white settlers came to a head in the late 1820s, Keokuk’s influence among 
the Sauk had “cut deeply into the number of Black Hawk’s followers,” and 
a majority of the nation did not pursue military action.6 When Black 
Hawk published an account of the war in his autobiography Life of 
Mà- ka- tai- me- she- kià- kiàk, or Black Hawk (1833), the story of his lost 
campaign also presented a narrative about the loss of community co-
herence, due to the accommodationist influence of Keokuk.
To complicate what Alvin Josephy once named “the rivalry of Black 
Hawk and Keokuk,” this essay situates Black Hawk’s autobiography in 
the context of Keokuk’s oratory and the workings of Indian diplomacy 
at the Rock Island agency, in present- day Illinois.7 A critical emphasis 
on print publication has meant that literary studies have accessed 
Keokuk almost exclusively through Black Hawk’s repre sen ta tion of him 
in his memoirs, rather than through the manuscript rec ords of his own 
oratory. Yet Black Hawk’s Life of Mà- ka- tai- me- she- kià- kiàk was but 
one of many collaborative publications from the Sauk Nation during this 
time, which also included the oratory, petitions, and treaty councils in 
which Keokuk participated.8 When seen alongside Black Hawk’s Life, 
Keokuk’s speeches and councils challenge the tropes by which scholars 
have made sense of how both tribal leaders rhetorically engaged federal 
Indian policy and Sauk removal. Against critical interpretations that 
have placed Keokuk and Black Hawk on opposing sides of a cultural- 
political spectrum, I suggest that their respective publications critique 
in overlapping ways the network of agents and traders who administered 
Indian affairs in the Rock Island area. As both of them navigated com-
munication cir cuits that included Native and non- Native coauthors, 
amanuenses, and translators, Black Hawk and Keokuk took part in 
textual collaborations that integrated oral per for mance, translation, 
manuscript writing, and print publishing.  These per for mances  were 
embedded in the diplomatic structures of the Indian agency at Rock Is-
land and the Superintendency of Indian Affairs in St. Louis, but they also 
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recorded sustained critiques of Indian policy as it was carried out by 
American administrators. 
Starting from this premise, this essay develops three related claims. 
In the first section I argue that Black Hawk’s Life of Mà- ka- tai- me- she- 
kià- kiàk was a collaborative publication that both enlisted and inter-
vened in a network of traders and administrators at the Rock Island 
Indian agency. Second, I argue that Keokuk’s speeches and petitions, ad-
dressed to administrators in the Office of Indian Affairs, constituted a 
similar attempt to both employ and critique existing colonial networks, 
by establishing a rec ord of the policy failures of the imbricated networks 
of white traders and US administrators. Fi nally, in the third section I ar-
gue that while Keokuk is often understood as accommodating Ameri-
can traders and settlers while boosting his own influence, his oratory 
articulated a sustained response to the economic pressures that accel-
erated settler expansion and Indian removal in the Midwest. While Kek-
ouk’s speeches  were  shaped by forms of collaboration and mistranslation 
that  shaped Indian diplomacy, they should nevertheless be taken seri-
ously as impor tant public discourse on the consequences of land en-
croachment and indigenous displacement during the era of removal. 
Rather than a mere extension of US administrative networks, Keokuk’s 
councils and speeches offered moments of institutional critique and in-
tervention. At stake in this argument is not a desire to restore Keokuk’s 
reputation or to recuperate his historical agency but rather to offer a per-
spective on removal- era indigenous oral per for mance beyond tropes of 
re sis tance and accommodation.9 Writing and publishing are always ac-
culturated activities, taking place, as Richard Brodhead puts it, in con-
crete cultural situations and a “landscape of institutional structures.”10 
Black Hawk and Keokuk both critiqued the colonial bureaucracy by en-
listing its communication cir cuits: as they navigated the technologies of 
the Indian Office they used collaborative forms of publication to inter-
vene in its operations.11 Seen together, their publications offer a fuller 
understanding of indigenous writing that engaged with Indian removal 
in the Old Northwest, as it was elaborated and contested at the Rock 
Island Indian agency. 
“Bad Management”: Black Hawk’s Life as Policy Critique
In his 1833 memoirs Life of Mà- ka- tai- me- she- kià- kiàk, the warrior 
Black Hawk (1767–1838) pres ents a corrective reading of the history of 
treaty- making that led to the war that came to bear his name. He recounts 
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how in 1804 the US general William Henry Harrison had made a dubi-
ous agreement with a Sauk del e ga tion led by the tribal leader 
Quàshquàme: the Sauk delegates  were brought to St. Louis  under false 
pretense and pressured to sign a treaty even though they “had been 
drunk the greater part of the time” (28–29).12 The resulting treaty ceded 
to the United States large territories in present- day Illinois, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin and profoundly  shaped US- Sauk relations in the de cades that 
followed.13  After the War of 1812, Black Hawk looked to  England for pro-
tection from the United States, and his “British Band” of followers 
continuously challenged the fraudulent land seizure and resisted the 
encroachment of white homesteaders in the region. When in 1832 Black 
Hawk went back east and re- crossed the Mississippi to find the Sauk vil-
lage of Saukenuk occupied by white settlers, this ushered in a fifteen- 
week war between settler volunteers and Black Hawk’s followers from 
the Sauk and Meskwaki nations, as well as allies from several other 
tribes. William Clark, who served as the superintendent of Indian trade 
in St. Louis, showed no tolerance for the British Band and defended what 
he called a “war of extermination” against Black Hawk and his follow-
ers.14 The Americans ultimately defeated Black Hawk’s forces in the 
 Battle of Bad Axe on August 2, 1832. It was more a massacre than a  battle; 
volunteers shot dozens of Native men,  women, and  children as they tried 
to go back west across the Mississippi. Although estimates vary, the 
Sauk and their allies suffered between 450 and 600 casualties, opposed 
to 77 on the American side.15
Following the war, the tribal leader Keokuk (ca. 1780–1848) was 
among the signers of a new treaty that was to shape their history for 
years to come. Made up in the presence of the generals Winfield Scott 
and John Reynolds, the 1832 treaty stipulated a cession of all Sauk lands 
east of the Mississippi, including the principal village of Saukenuk, near 
present- day Rock Island, Illinois. While a four hundred square- mile tract 
of land on both sides of the Iowa River was to be kept as a reservation, 
the treaty proclaimed the remaining Sauk lands opened for settlement be-
ginning in June 1833.16 Black Hawk, meanwhile, was taken to the East 
Coast along with four other allied Sauk and Meskwaki leaders. The War 
Department held them in  Virginia for several weeks before taking them 
on a widely publicized tour of major cities, during which they became 
popu lar figures through public events and newspapers coverage.17 When 
he was brought back to Rock Island and Keokuk had negotiated his re-
lease, Black Hawk entrusted the story of his life and the war to the gov-
ernment translator Antoine LeClaire and the newspaper editor John 
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Barton Patterson. First published in Cincinnati in 1833, Black Hawk’s 
Life was widely popu lar in eastern American cities and was reprinted 
many times over the next de cade. 
Although the Life was published for American readers in eastern cit-
ies, the book is also a rec ord of US- Indian diplomacy, and its collabora-
tive authorship extended an intertwined networks of tribal leaders, 
traders, and government administrators. Black Hawk’s memoirs consti-
tute a translated and transcribed account of an oral per for mance, and 
Timothy Sweet reminds us that the “immediate audience” of this per for-
mance was the American government, “as represented in the person of 
the interpreter LeClaire and the physical space of the Rock Island 
Agency.”18 Situated at the confluence of the Mississippi and Rock River, 
Rock Island was the site of the US military outpost Fort Armstrong, 
where the trader Thomas Forsyth served as Indian agent to the Sauk and 
Meskwaki  people. Forsyth worked closely with George Davenport, who 
operated a trading  house for the American Fur Com pany (AFC) on the 
island.19 Black Hawk’s editors, Patterson and LeClaire,  were part of the 
overlapping network of traders and administrators on Rock Island: 
Patterson became a clerk for Davenport’s com pany around the same 
time he began publication of the Life, and LeClaire worked not only as 
the US government interpreter but also as a trader for Davenport and the 
Chouteau Com pany.20 Traders such as Davenport and LeClaire repre-
sented what Francis Paul Prucha calls an “influential and sometimes 
dominating third party” in the relations between tribal nations and the 
United States government.21 White settlement put pressure on Indian na-
tions to make large land cessions in exchange for annuities, which di-
minished their access to hunting grounds and animal populations during 
their seasonal hunts. The increasing dependence on trading  houses for 
goods— and the diminishing profits of the fur trade— led Indian nations 
into debt, and they often paid traders directly from the annuities they 
received in exchange for land cessions. By 1825 it became standard prac-
tice for the American government to pay traders directly on behalf of 
tribal nations, which incentivized traders to become more and more 
involved in US- Indian treaty negotiations.22
Reconstructing the events that led up to the war of 1832, Black 
Hawk’s Life offers an institutional critique of the imbrication of traders 
and Indian agents at Rock Island, implicating LeClaire, Davenport, and 
Thomas Forsyth in the mismanagement of Indian affairs. Black Hawk 
suggests that although he had long held the door open for negotiations 
with the American government, he was never taken seriously as a 
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partner in dialogue. Instead, his conversations with Forsyth, LeClaire, 
and Davenport only offer a space for the promotion of removal policy: 
I visited Rock Island. The agent [Forsyth] again ordered me to quit 
my village. He said, that if we did not, troops would be sent to 
drive us off. He reasoned with me, and told me, it would be better 
for us to be with the rest of our  people, so that we might avoid 
difficulty, and live in peace. The interpreter [LeClaire] joined him, 
and gave me so many good reasons, that I almost wished I had not 
undertaken the difficult task that I had pledged myself to my brave 
band to perform. (99)
Black Hawk calls on Davenport, who had “long been my friend, but [was] 
now amongst  those advising me to give up my village” (99). As he is pre-
pared to listen to his “friend,” Black Hawk proves himself less intransi-
gent than his interlocutors, all of whom see Sauk removal as the only 
 viable option. Davenport inquires  whether Black Hawk would consider 
a sum of six thousand dollars to “remove to the west side of the Missis-
sippi” if it  were authorized by William Clark, the superintendent of In-
dian trade at St. Louis. Yet before Black Hawk can make a decision, news 
Figure 1. Treaty at Fort Armstrong. Artist’s impression of Fort Armstrong on Rock Island. In Benjamin 
Drake, The  Great Indian Chief of the West: Or, Life and Adventures of Black Hawk (Cincinnati: H. M. 
Rulison, 1855). University of Louisville Special Collections and Archives.
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from St. Louis arrives that Clark “would give us nothing!— and said if 
we did not remove immediately, we should be drove off!” (100–101).
Black Hawk’s critique suggests that the war was not inevitable but 
that the conflict deteriorated due to a structure in which the shared rhe-
toric of  these dif fer ent actors (trader, Indian agent, interpreter, and 
superintendent) did not offer any space for serious dialogue. As Neil 
Schmitz has pointed out, in the narrative the trader, agent, and inter-
preter are unnamed and “spoken of almost as a single identity,  because 
what they say to the Sauks is always the same.”23 Even the replacement 
of the Indian agent Thomas Forsyth did not bring about any changes in 
the entrenched rhe toric within this network. In the spring of 1830, hav-
ing served for eigh teen years, Forsyth was dismissed from his ser vice 
 after voicing criticisms of Clark and was replaced by Felix St. Vrain, a 
sawmill operator who was only thirty- one years old.24 Black Hawk 
 initially imagines that Forsyth’s dismissal might bring about discur-
sive change at Rock Island: “About this time our agent was put out of of-
fice. I then thought, if it was for wanting to make us leave our village, it 
was right— because I was tired of hearing him talk about it” (101). Black 
Hawk, however, finds only a continued lack of dialogue: “The interpreter, 
who had been equally as bad in trying to persuade us to leave our village, 
was retained in office— and the young man who took the place of our 
agent, told the same old story over, about removing us” (101). In other 
words, despite the appointment of a new Indian agent, the change in 
personnel does not bring about any discursive change.
Nevertheless, Black Hawk does not divest from diplomacy alto-
gether, even as he begins to consider military action. At a key moment 
in the book, the tribal leader Neapope informs Black Hawk that British 
and Potawotami forces  will come to his aid against the settler volun-
teers, as foretold by the Winnebago prophet Wabokieshiek. Keokuk, how-
ever, tries to convince Black Hawk that he has “been imposed upon by 
liars, and had much better remain where I was and keep quiet.” Keokuk 
proposes that they ask William Clark for permission to “go to Washing-
ton to see our  Great  Father” and have their “difficulties settled amica-
bly” (111–12). It is only when they hear “nothing favorable from the  great 
chief at St.  Louis” that Black Hawk mobilizes his warriors. He notes 
that “the peacable disposition of Ke- o- kuck, and his  people” has been 
“the cause of our having been driven from our village” and proceeds to 
“recruit all my own band” (112).25  Here the narrative seems to pres ent a 
clear binary: Black Hawk is action- driven, leaning  toward military 
options, and swayed by Native in for mants, while Keokuk is passive, 
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“peacable,” and persuaded by the information from American officials. 
Yet even when Black Hawk first decides on military action, he does not 
reject the notion of further diplomacy. Once more he reminds his audi-
ence that Keokuk urged Davenport to request a diplomatic trip to Wash-
ington, but they “received no answer” from his superiors. As interpreted 
by Patterson and LeClaire, Black Hawk notes that “ every overture had 
been made by Ke- o- kuck to prevent difficulty, and I anxiously hoped that 
something would be done for my  people, that it might be avoided. But 
 there was bad management somewhere, or the difficulty that has taken 
place would have been avoided” (112).26 Black Hawk’s diagnosis of “bad 
management” obscures individual accountability, but it also blames the 
escalation of the conflict on the Indian Office’s management of informa-
tion between its dif fer ent administrators. Black Hawk points out a sys-
temic inefficiency in the communication cir cuits that linked Keokuk and 
Davenport at Rock Island to Clark in St. Louis and the “ Great  Father” in 
Washington. In spite of their shared rhe toric of removal, the disconnect 
between the traders and administrators leaves no space for Black 
Hawk, Keokuk, or even Davenport to meaningfully influence policy. 
Besides its critique of the Black Hawk War, then, the Life reveals 
how the entrenched rhe toric of removal policy worked in tandem with 
what Ronald Satz terms the “remarkable diffusion of power and decision 
making authority from Washington to the field.”27 In its administration 
of Indian affairs, the federal government did not represent a far- reaching 
hegemonic power but rather a weak imperial node within the triad of co-
lonial government, settlers, and Indian nations.28 This is not to suggest 
that Indian removal happened in the absence of federal policy: indeed 
the vio lence of the Black Hawk War was a coordinated exertion of 
military power. But the Indian Office’s emphasis on local decision- 
making also placed the administration of Indian affairs with locally 
stationed individuals who  were poorly connected to federal overseers 
and other agents.29 This administrative decentralization meant that In-
dian removal not only depended on federal policy directives but was re-
fracted through local and regional interests. Rather than a monolithic 
settler state, Black Hawk engaged a decentered Indian policy that was 
filtered through the face- to- face negotiations among tribal leaders, 
William Clark, Indian agents, and traders. The Life, then, does not re-
sist diplomacy but inefficient diplomacy; not the management of In-
dian affairs but the “bad management” of a range of problematically 
connected agencies. It is in  these spaces that Black Hawk offers a co-
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gent critique of the administrative disconnect that marked federal 
 Indian policy in the early nineteenth  century. 
“Our Wants and Our Wishes”: Keokuk’s Oratory as Institutional Intervention
In its critique of the administration of Indian affairs, Black Hawk’s 
Life sees the oratory of the tribal leader Keokuk as a key  factor in the 
Sauk Nation’s removal from Saukenuk. According to Black Hawk, Keokuk 
used his rhetorical skills to discredit him and to foment dissension 
among the Sauk: “Ke- o- kuck, who has a smooth tongue, and is a  great 
speaker, was busy in persuading my band that I was wrong— and thereby 
making many of them dissatisfied with me” (98–99). Keokuk’s “smooth 
tongue” thereby plays an active role in the formation of Sauk factional-
ism, acceding to pressures from American treaty negotiators to aban-
don the village of Saukenuk.30 “We  were a divided  people,” Black Hawk 
reflects, “forming two parties, Ke- o- kuck being at the head of one, will-
ing to barter our rights merely for the good opinion of the whites; and 
cowardly enough to desert our village to them” (97–98). In light of Black 
Hawk’s refusal to remove, Keokuk’s legitimacy as tribal leader is com-
promised by his complicity in the decision- making of Indian agents, trad-
ers, and treaty commissioners. It is no accident, then, that where the 
Life is widely read  today, Keokuk’s oratory has all but dis appeared from 
critical review. In studies of Black Hawk’s Life, Keokuk has emerged al-
ternately as a “nonwarrior who repeatedly violates Sauk traditions,” an 
“unreliable indicator of popu lar assent to US claims,” and as one of many 
“puppet leaders” who falsely assumed tribal leadership and worked at 
the behest of the United States government.31 
The lack of critical attention to Keokuk’s oratory, however, risks 
overlooking a body of texts that inform us about the role of tribal lead-
ers within bureaucratic discourses during the removal era. His perfor-
mative interactions in US- Indian councils asserted the presence of a 
Sauk po liti cal voice within the loose networks that constituted the Indian 
Office. Phillip Round has argued that Indian nations’ participation in 
public discourse as a po liti cal presence depended on the bureaucratic 
structures of the Indian Office. The communication networks of the 
Indian Office revealed the “efforts of indigenous nations . . .  to con-
struct and perform a public, po liti cal Indianness” and constituted what 
Round calls a “mixed audience of Native and non- Native auditors in the 
public sphere of the early Republic.”32 As a diplomat with frequent access 
to colonial administrators, Keokuk had intimate knowledge of the 
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workings of the Indian Office and 
the protocols of Indian diplomacy. 
During the War of 1812 a Sauk 
tribal council had first appointed 
him as war chief,  after which he 
became “a spokesman for the 
tribe with the United States gov-
ernment” and engaged in treaty 
councils with Thomas Forsyth and 
William Clark as early as 1816.33 In 
1824 he took part in a tribal del e ga-
tion to Washington, where he con-
tested the Osages’ sale of lands 
in Missouri, arguing successfully 
that  these lands belonged to the 
Sauk “by the same right by which 
the United States claimed its land, 
by right of conquest.”34 And in the 
summer of 1830 Keokuk secured a 
thousand dollar payment of trade 
goods to compensate for the death 
of several Meskwaki men who had been killed by a Sioux 
war party. On this occasion Keokuk brought about two 
hundred warriors to the grounds of William Clark’s office 
in St. Louis, staging a public bodily per for mance of Sauk 
sovereignty to remind Clark that Native nations still had the capability 
to insist on the conditions of Indian diplomacy.35 
Keokuk’s role in the Indian Office, however, depended on fraught 
collaborations with colonial administrators. Like Black Hawk’s Life, his 
councils with US administrators  were oral per for mances that  were tran-
scribed and translated by government interpreters— most frequently 
Antoine LeClaire— and  shaped by the colonial logics and limited options 
of US Indian policy.36 One of his most frequent interlocutors was William 
Clark, the superintendent of Indian trade in St. Louis. Clark’s influence 
in this capacity ranged widely: he controlled Indian agents, issued li-
censes and passports, provided payments for injuries and injustices, ar-
rested and punished lawbreakers, surveyed bound aries, distributed 
annuities, and conducted treaty councils.37 As Jay Buckley observes, 
Clark’s importance in the region was such that American Indian leaders 
often deemed treaties invalid  unless they  were conducted with Clark 
Figure 2. Thomas M. Easterly, 
Chief Keokuk aka the Watchful 
Fox. Daguerreotype, 1847. 
Courtesy of the Missouri History 
Museum, St. Louis.
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personally.38 Keokuk’s councils with Clark negotiated between the need 
to assert a politicized Sauk voice, and the Indian Office’s ideological 
translation of his speech acts. In the spring of 1830, while conflicts be-
tween Black Hawk’s “British Band” and white settlers intensified, Keokuk 
met with Clark to propose a del e ga tion of Sauk leaders to Washington.39 
Clark had recommended the del e ga tion to the US War Department, but 
he informed Keokuk that his superiors wished “to know more about 
it.” Keokuk, however, refused to give Clark further details  until he 
could meet in council with other Sauk and Meskwaki leaders. His si-
lence pushed Clark to enumerate Keokuk’s goals in his place:
You want peace among yourselves with your neighbors . . .  You 
want to be settled . . .  and to be by yourselves, that you may rise as 
a Nation. You want an enlargement of your annuities, so that you 
may be enabled to help yourselves in your new establishments. 
You are harassed with debts & you wish to be extricated from 
 those which are now hanging over you. You are dissatisfied with 
the sale made of your lands many years since  because it was not 
understood by the nation. You want it well understood by every-
one. You also want to do something to unite the British party with 
your own & to bring both Tribes of Sacs & Foxes together, so as to 
be strong and respectable as a Nation. And you think if you could 
get rid of spirituous liquors from among you, your happiness & 
comfort could be effected . . .  Have I not guessed pretty nearly 
your wants?40
Signing off on this list, Keokuk responded that Clark “described exactly 
our wants & our wishes.” 41 
Keokuk’s silence indicates that he occupied a position where he was 
not purely suppliant to Clark: he effectively forced the superintendent 
to adopt a Sauk po liti cal perspective and enumerate the many prob lems 
and crises that indigenous nations  were facing. Still, with Keokuk assent-
ing to Clark’s projection of his po liti cal motivations, this stylized speech 
act also elaborated an American bureaucratic interpretation of Keokuk’s 
demands. For instance, Keokuk assented to Clark’s proposal to “bring 
both Tribes of Sacs & Foxes together, so as to be strong and respectable 
as a Nation.” This controversial move to treat with the Sauk and Meskwa-
kis as one nation (reaffirmed in the Treaty of 1832) streamlined Indian 
diplomacy but also ignored the Meskwaki’s sovereign status as a sepa-
rate nation.42 Moreover, in a separate council, Clark recommended to 
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Keokuk the strategy of paying off their tribal debts through land 
cessions:
As we are now in private council, I  will give you my opinion (my 
private opinion, & that from the Govt) of what you should do. You 
should offer to sell to the Government a piece of your land on the 
Mississippi for the purpose of enlarging your annuities, to enable 
you to pay your debts, & to assist you in farming . . .  Should it 
succeed it  will be the only means of keeping together all your 
 people, by applying with effect for the general benefit what ever 
means the nation should possess.43
Clark’s projection of Keokuk’s “wants” and “wishes,” then, was also an 
act of colonial translation, making Keokuk’s politics legible in a situa-
tion that was  shaped by the superintendent’s own po liti cal proj ects. 
Furthermore, he capitalized on the interpersonal dimensions of In-
dian diplomacy, reiterating that  these  were his “private opinions, as 
your friend, not being authorized thereto by the Government.” 44 But 
what made the council “private” all of the sudden? The interpreter was 
still  there, the talk was written down and circulated (and archived) in 
the Indian Office, and Clark advised Keokuk on  matters of public in-
terest. Indeed, the categories of “public” and “private” fail to describe 
the context of  these diplomatic interactions: the Indian Office was a 
loose network of indigenous and settler participants in councils and 
treaties, and the reliance of Indian diplomacy on face- to- face commu-
nications allowed administrators like Clark a significant mea sure of 
autonomy.45 
Through the intimate dimensions of Indian diplomacy, however, 
Native leaders also claimed a significant mea sure of institutional agency, 
and Keokuk took up collaborative forms of writing to inflect US policy. 
He repeatedly charged the Indian Office with a failure to uphold the 
agreements made in treaties and outlined the  ripple effects of white set-
tlement in the Mississippi River Valley. In 1830 Keokuk criticized the 
Indian Office’s failure to uphold the agreements of the treaty council at 
Prairie du Chien five years earlier. At the 1825 treaty council commis-
sioners had negotiated peace and a reconfiguration of tribal borders with 
representatives from the Sioux, Sauk, Meskwaki, Menominee, Ioway, 
Winnebago, Ojibwe, Ottawa, and Potawatomi nations.46 In subsequent 
years, however, white settlement put pressure on the neutral hunting 
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grounds, which led to frequent violent conflicts between hunters from 
the Sioux and the Sauk and Meskwaki nations. At a council with William 
Clark in the summer of 1830, Keokuk therefore voiced his refusal to at-
tend a new upcoming treaty council at Prairie du Chien in July of that 
year, due to the recent murder of Peahmuska, one of the Meskwaki sign-
ers of the 1825 treaty. Peahmuska had been invited by an Indian agent 
to come to Prairie du Chien on official business but was killed by an 
 enemy war party on the way:
My  Father: We have never before refused you anything, you have 
always said true (ever had your own way) but now we cannot 
go . . .  I am firm and immovable in my determination not to go to 
Prairie du Chien . . .  My  Father: I now tell you from the bottom of 
my heart that I cannot go to Prairie du Chien & hope I  will say 
true, and have my way in my turn, for once. I am done.47
Keokuk’s deci ded tone signals a moment when the conversational back- 
and- forth of his councils became an uncompromising statement of an 
absolute position. Keokuk asked, “How is it pos si ble for our  people to 
go to P. du Chien? When [Peahmuska] went to Washington the President 
gave him a Flag, a medal & some other  things; when he was  going to 
P. du Chien he took  these  things with him to show who & what he was, 
but he was fallen upon by murderers, and his flag, Your Flag, the Flag of 
the United States was trod  under foot & then burned.” 48 Keokuk’s rhe-
torical question directly communicated a po liti cal situation that was no 
longer tenable. By evoking the flag and medal that Peahmuska had re-
ceived in Washington, he challenged the meaning of such symbols in 
light of the inability of the United States to provide the protections 
that it had promised. 
In his own way, then, Keokuk, too, offered a critique of the treaty 
system, questioning the legitimacy and practical use of Indian diplomacy 
if the agreements they established had  little meaning on the ground. In 
 doing so he maneuvered Clark into a response that laid bare the limita-
tions of the Indian Office. Clark explained that the death of Peahmuska 
resulted from what he called the “bad management” of Indian affairs 
around Prairie du Chien. He explained that the Indian agent who had in-
vited Peahmuska “was ignorant of Indian affairs,” thinking that “one or 
two chiefs could make a peace for both your Tribes.” Moreover, he ex-
plained that Peahmuska was “killed at an unfortunate time for his  people 
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& by bad management they  were deceived.” 49 As in Black Hawk’s Life, 
the lack of specificity in this “bad management” registers a bureaucratic 
discourse in which agency and accountability  were muddled. But 
Keokuk’s intervention did push Clark to explain that the invitation lead-
ing to Peahmuska’s death was “from a dif fer ent power than that of a 
Sub Agent,” coming from a French fur trader of the Mackinac Com pany 
at Prairie du Chien.50 As Clark acknowledged his own office’s inability 
to control the opaque roles of Indian agents and traders in a world of 
intertribal and imperial rivalries, Keokuk’s performative interactions 
identified the mismanagement of Indian affairs on the part of colonial 
administrators. 
Over the following years, as conflicts with the Sioux intensified, 
Keokuk repeatedly addressed the failures of the reor ga ni za tion of Indian 
country, but he did not see the issue addressed by Clark or other admin-
istrators. In 1832, along with seven other Sauk and Meskwaki tribal lead-
ers, he collaborated on a letter to Clark that outlined recent conflicts 
with the Eastern Dakota, identified in the Indian Office rec ords as the 
“Sioux.”51 Pointing out that the Sioux “advanced within our bound aries 
seventy miles,” they insisted the US government “take such mea sures as 
 will oblige the Sioux to keep within their own limits, for without this, it 
is impossible for a peace to last.”52 Two years  later Keokuk sat in coun-
cil with General Henry Atkinson, the military commander at Jefferson 
Barracks near St. Louis. He implicated the Sioux agent’s involvement in 
the deterioration of intertribal relations, arguing that the “Sioux Agent 
and trader . . .  advise the Sioux to go on the Sac land and hunt.” He ar-
gued that whereas the Indian agent and trader to the Sauk went “the 
straight road” and advised them “to keep back on our own land,” the 
trader and agent of the Sioux told them “to go any where they can find 
game.”53 Settler expansion and Indian removal thus played out in a com-
plex intertribal geography; Keokuk found himself caught between, on the 
one hand, the demands of Sauk and Meskwaki warriors who wanted him 
to enter into  battle with the Sioux, and on the other hand, directives from 
Clark to preserve peace— but without any commitment from the Indian 
Office to make that attainable. 
Given this difficult diplomatic position, Keokuk’s oratory displaced 
the more fundamental prob lem of white settler expansion onto the cri-
sis of their conflicts with the Sioux. He explained to Atkinson that his 
long- standing request— for American administrators to regulate a chang-
ing world of intertribal borders and relations— had systematically been 
ignored by vari ous colonial administrators:
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Our  Great  Father the President had us all gather together at 
Prairie- du- Chien three dif fer ent times to talk to us— and  every 
time I expressed my wish that the Commissioners sent by the 
President could make known to the Sioux’s that they  were not to 
come on our land . . .  last fall a year ago when Genl Scott made a 
treaty with us I requested him to tell the Sioux’s to keep off our 
land— last spring I came to see Genl Clark and repeated the same 
words to him— and came  here and repeated the same words to 
you.54
Keokuk documented the discrepancies between the promises made in 
treaties and the repeated failures to address the social upheavals caused 
by the reor ga ni za tion of Indian country. By 1834, however, he also came 
to directly critique the encroachment of white Americans onto Sauk 
lands. That year he collaborated with three other tribal leaders— 
Pashepaho, Wawk- kum- mee, and Pia- tshe- noay—on a letter to William 
Clark to protest the presence of white hunters in Sauk country. Since 
they had received “no satisfactory answer” from the Indian agent about 
this  matter, they took “recourse to this paper”— and to the interpreter 
Francois Labussier—to inform Clark that  there  were “white  people hunt-
ing on our land since last fall and their intention is to remain all this 
winter and the next spring.”55 Again they critiqued the lack of account-
ability in the networks of the Indian Office, noting that they had “in-
formed our  father the Agent of our Tribes of it. But we received no 
satisfactory answer.” Appealing to Clark’s sense of “justice” and “benev-
olence,” they insisted the Indian Office “remedy our right that is  violated 
by the White  peoples.”56 
Keokuk, then, was a more vocal critic of US Indian policy than his 
dismissal as a “puppet leader” allows. This does not mean, of course, that 
Keokuk undid the colonial logics and policies of  these networks; by the 
same token his consistent participation in  these diplomatic interactions 
reflects how the Indian Office co- opted the work of tribal leaders to 
accommodate American policy goals. Keokuk’s speech acts  were 
 constrained by the po liti cal projections of US administrators— Clark, 
Davenport, Street, and LeClaire— and ultimately did not resist the Indian 
Office’s promotion of Sauk removal. However, as the Sauk and Meskwaki 
nations faced the pressures of land encroachment and the erosion of 
their po liti cal sovereignty,  these fraught collaborations also reveal an 
impor tant attempt to find new routes within colonial governmental net-
works, to secure a critical, politicized Native voice within them. 
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“White Hard Money”: Economic Policy and Tribal  Futures in Keokuk’s 
Oratory
Seen alongside Black Hawk’s Life, Keokuk’s speeches are a reminder 
that Sauk removal was not limited to the events of the Black Hawk War, 
as they point to a longer history of land theft and bureaucratic misman-
agement that eroded the Sauk and Meskwaki’s claim to place. Beyond 
the direct physical vio lence of the war, they dealt with the limitations of 
a diplomatic apparatus that tried and in many ways failed to manage the 
upheavals caused by white settlement.57 If Indian nations  were not, 
strictly, “internal” to the US settler state, Indian diplomacy was never-
theless  shaped by the actions of a settler government that sought to se-
cure Indian “pacification” by means of financial policy and the remapping 
of borders. 
As Keokuk navigated this bureaucracy to secure a po liti cal Sauk 
voice within it, it is worth noting that his oratory expressed  little dis-
trust of the translated and written word. Rather, Keokuk recognized that 
the Sauk Nation had moved into a new situation where the written word 
was now central to the negotiation of US- Indian relations, and he em-
braced translation and transcription as techniques to prevent the inaus-
picious manipulation of spoken language. He repeatedly insisted that 
his words be written down on paper, to be sent to the American presi-
dent in Washington. In council with General Henry Atkinson in 1834, 
Keokuk explained that “in shaking hands with you we shake hands with 
the  Great  Father the President. What we say to you now we wish you to 
put down on paper, so that the president may know what we have said 
to you.”58 And at a council with the Indian agent Joseph Street, Keokuk 
requested he “send this talk to the President of the US and ask him 
to send us an answer by you in the Spring.”59 Imagining that the written 
rec ord of his oral communications would reach the “ Great  Father” in 
Washington, he saw written documents as holding the potential to be 
passed on in a reliable, routinized way. Relying on the pen as much as 
his own “smooth tongue,” he believed that “when you make treaties, you 
put them on paper and the paper cannot lie.” 60
His investment in the constancy of the written word was an implicit 
criticism of Americans’ disregard for treaties. For Keokuk, only the com-
plementary use of oratory and writing could make any council po liti-
cally valuable, and he saw the potential of written documents not as 
deception but accountability. Although his own words  were subject 
to  colonial mistranslation, creating  these written documents meant 
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 establishing a material rec ord of the failures of (oral) communications 
within the Indian Office. But to do so he had to rely on the available re-
sources and collaborators within the US bureaucracy. For instance, the 
work of the government translator Antoine LeClaire was key in estab-
lishing this written rec ord, and when in August 1834 an act of Congress 
threatened to reduce his pay, Keokuk protested the move:
This Man is our Interpreter, we have long used him, he speaks our 
language well, and when we want to speak to our  Father we know 
he  will get all say correctly, and that that what is said to us  will be 
truly repeated. We have  great confidence in him for he never 
deceived us. He now tells us you have reduced his pay so much 
that he  will not be able to Interpret for what you offer him any 
longer . . .  We are very sorry for this. For we can have no other 
Interpreter but this man.61
Keokuk’s statement reflects the duality of his position. On one level, he 
was working in the interest of the Indian agent, traders, and translator 
at Rock Island; on another level he defended the need for the Sauk 
 Nation to retain a voice in the negotiations between tribal leaders and 
the Indian Office. Yet he emphasized the importance of placing Sauk na-
tional interests above US financial considerations, arguing, “We have no 
confidence that our talk, and yours, would be truly understood . . .  if this 
man is not by to talk between us. We hope our  Great  Father  will con-
sider this and . . .  not deprive my Nation of their interpreter to save a  little 
money.” 62 Keokuk’s support of LeClaire reflected his dependence on ex-
isting resources in  these bureaucratic settings to retain a mea sure of 
control over their repre sen ta tion within scenes of Indian diplomacy.
Keokuk’s diplomacy, then, did not only critique the workings of the 
Indian Office but sought to continue its operations to make them work 
positively for tribal- national economic and po liti cal goals. In the course 
of the 1830s Keokuk tethered this to the question of how annuity pay-
ments  were made to the Sauk and Meskwaki nations. By 1834  there had 
emerged disagreement among tribal members and chiefs over  whether 
annuities should be paid to tribal leaders to redistribute them or directly 
to individual families. As Michael Green explains, prior to that year  there 
had not been a fixed policy: some annuities  were paid in money and some 
in goods; some  were made to the chiefs and  others  were made to the heads 
of individual families. In 1834 Congress investigated a new organ ization 
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of Indian policy regarding annuity payments: while it recommended 
payments to the chiefs, it was still pos si ble to authorize individual 
payments if the tribe wished it.63 Keokuk had argued in 1833 that pay-
ments to tribal leaders  were already sanctioned by the principal chiefs. 
He asked, “When any  thing happens between us & the whites or be-
tween us & other Indians, to whom do you apply? . . .  When difficulties 
are to be settled, treaties to be held, or any business of consequence to 
be transacted, you apply to the Chiefs . . .  The annuities should be paid 
in the old way— all concerned  will be benefitted by it.” 64 For Keokuk 
this prior practice— rooted in the traditional role of tribal leaders as 
redistributing goods— legitimized the disbursement to the civil chiefs, 
and the practice continued to be followed throughout the 1830s. 
This practice became highly controversial and led to accusations of 
undue control over tribal funds, and Keokuk laid out several defenses 
for his decision. First, he insisted that the annuities should be paid to 
“one or two” of the principal chiefs to ensure social security for  those in 
need: 
Sometimes a considerate Indian comes to the Chiefs, and states 
that a poor  family are suffering for Provisions or clothing, the 
Chief then has to buy and give to them. Old men who cannot hunt, 
old  women who cannot work, or find support have to be fed & 
clothed by the heads of the nations, and if the Chiefs have no more 
means to afford the required relief, than  others, the helpless and 
miserable must suffer.65
Second, Keokuk argued that the centralized payment would be a means 
to preserve peace with other Indian nations, as it enabled the chiefs to 
pay off warriors who might other wise go to war in retaliation. He ex-
plained to William Clark, “In case of the deaths of a brave . . .  the Chiefs 
can buy the necessary articles to bury him. It is also the only means 
which the Chiefs have of turning back a war party of young men—by 
paying them.” 66 Keokuk found himself managing a transition from an 
older po liti cal economy— shaped by the re distribution of goods and the 
po liti cal agency of young warriors—to a new real ity that was  shaped by 
the economic relations among tribal nations, white settlers, and traders. 
Envisioning the annuity payments as a collective resource for a mea-
sure of social stability, Keokuk held that one of the most immediate 
prob lems facing the Sauks and Meskwakis was the economic assault 
on Indian country. By working through the Indian Office he elaborated 
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an economic policy that was aimed at “tribal economic solvency through 
small land cessions,” in an attempt to avoid the complete loss of Sauk 
and Meskwaki lands and removal from Iowa.67 Managing tribal debts 
was key in this effort. Ever since Thomas Jefferson’s administration, US 
policymakers had pushed the idea of leading Indian nations into debt to 
make them “favorably disposed to extinguishing their debts through land 
cessions.” 68 To secure a  future place for Indian nations therefore de-
manded a coherent vision of economic exchange and financial policy; 
receiving the annuity payments on a collective basis was a potential 
means to retain control over economic policy, reduce tribal debts, and 
prevent  future land cessions.
But besides his arguments for centralized distribution to the chiefs, 
Keokuk also insisted that the annuity payments be made in specie, as 
was stipulated in their treaties with the United States. In 1837 Keokuk 
sat in council with the Indian agent Joseph Street and Captain Edward 
Hitchcock, the disbursement officer to the governor of Wisconsin Terri-
tory, and he addressed the rumors  going around that the annuities  were 
 going to be paid in goods instead of what Keokuk called “white hard 
money.” Since the tribal leaders had promised to pay their traders in 
cash, receiving the annuities in goods would have put them in a difficult 
position. Similar to his insistence on a written rec ord of US- Indian ne-
gotiations, Keokuk’s call for “white hard money” was materially linked 
to the American government’s obligations as written down in treaties:
I have been pres ent at  every treaty made with the Sac and Fox 
Nations, and they promise to pay for our lands in white hard 
money. Since we came  here, we are told we are not to get money, 
but goods. Our promise to our trader is to pay money, and goods 
 will not pay one money . . .  When you bought our lands, we did not 
ask what you would do with them, they  were yours to do what you 
pleased with them. We are told you have no more white hard 
money and  can’t pay money. We want money to pay to dif fer ent 
 people to whom we have given our promises, and we desire to be 
faithful.69
It may be easy to see why Keokuk is not as widely read as Black Hawk, 
but his criticism was clear: Keokuk’s object was US accountability for the 
agreements they had made. “We sold you one land, and you promised to 
pay us hard money for it,” Keokuk reminded the Indian agent. “We moved 
off the land, and  will abide by our Treaty, and so we hope  will you.”70
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Of course, Keokuk’s critique failed to disrupt the colonial logics 
 behind the treaty system, which translated Sauk and Meskwaki lands 
into a salable commodity. And his insistence that tribal leaders receive 
the annuity payments in cash has been dismissed by adversaries as a 
means to pocket the annuities to pay his “friends” at the trading  houses, 
the American Fur Com pany and the Chouteau Com pany.71 Yet the trad-
ing  houses  were a problematic but necessary component of a tribal econ-
omy that was based in a combination of trade, horticulture, and the 
winter hunt, or “seasonal round.” Keokuk’s catering to the traders re-
flected his  people’s slide into de pen dency and perhaps even the oppor-
tunism of tribal leaders, but it was also vitally impor tant to keep up  these 
trade relation. Removed from their homelands and experiencing rapid 
historical change, the Sauk and Meskwakis depended on the trading 
 houses for a constant access to information, goods, and credit. The de-
cline of the bison and game population had made their winter hunts less 
lucrative than in the past, and the encroachment of white settlers led to 
fewer neutral hunting grounds, making it harder to hunt without  great 
risk of conflict.72 In the midst of  these disruptions, the traders repre-
sented crucial access to a variety of goods. Keokuk was perhaps na-
ively dependent on them— all the more since American expansion thrived 
on promulgating tribal debts— but to maintain positive relations with 
traders was an impor tant link in their economy. The trading  houses ex-
tended credit for the necessary supplies to continue the seasonal round 
and keep the traditional economic organ ization alive into the end of the 
de cade.73
Rather than only an opportunistic catering to traders, Keokuk’s in-
sistence on cash payments mattered especially in 1837, when a financial 
panic drastically changed economic relations. In May that year banks 
in New York had suspended specie payments at full face value, leading 
the United States into a long- term economic depression. The panic halted 
the influx of settlers in the west, and coins became virtually impossible 
to come by in the western territories.74 As specie flooded out of the ter-
ritories, Indian nations receiving cash payments became the only enti-
ties for miles around that had access to specie in a “nearly cashless 
world.”75 Susan Gray has argued that the panic of 1837 and the ensuing 
economic depression made the reassertion of economic exchange 
with white settlers a key  factor in Native  people’s attempts to “claim a 
social and physical place” in the Midwest.76 The crisis made it more 
appealing for settlers to keep Indian nations around longer, and their 
treaty- stipulated access to specie meant leverage in a society that was 
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eco nom ically being reconfigured by the panic. Seen in this light, Keokuk’s 
insistence on cash payments could be impor tant for establishing the 
Sauk and Meskwaki nations as a permanent presence in Iowa: their ac-
cess to cash allowed for the possibility that they might become an eco-
nom ically stable influence in the region, making Indian removal an 
unattractive policy to white settlers in a region where coins  were few 
and far between. Seeing the centrality of debts as a key  factor in the vul-
nerability of Indian nations, Keokuk projected a situation beyond tribal 
debts, in which commercial relations with American traders would help 
tribal nations to carve out a less fragile position in a region that had been 
opened up for white settlement. 
Unfortunately, Keokuk’s vision proved to be a long shot. The annu-
ity controversy was resolved without creating lasting po liti cal divi-
sions: the annuities to the Sauk and Meskwakis  were paid to the tribal 
chiefs as usual in 1840, split between the chiefs and families in 1841, 
and paid entirely to heads of families in 1842. But as divisive as the an-
nuity controversy had been, the vari ous factions united in 1841 over the 
po liti cal question of removal.77 At the 1841 payments US commissioners 
pushed for the Sauk and Meskwaki nations to remove to present- day 
Minnesota, and Keokuk was widely supported in halting this scheme. 
But as the nations did not manage to achieve tribal solvency, and their 
tribal debts started to exceed annuity payments by 1842, they  were 
forced to remove to western Iowa in 1843 and to Indian Territory four 
years  later.78 
The history of Sauk removal thus extended well beyond the crisis 
of the Black Hawk War, to the prohibitive pressures of white settlement 
and removal policy to bureaucratic mismanagement and tribal debts. 
Within this history Keokuk’s oratory played an ambiguous part. On the 
one hand, he tried to make the colonial legacy of the treaty system work 
 toward securing a more permanent presence for the Sauk and Meskwaki 
nations, in a region that was undergoing rapid historical change. On the 
other hand, Keokuk’s participation in this diplomacy also perpetuated 
the problematic workings of US bureaucratic networks. It would be easy, 
therefore, to see Keokuk as the anti– Black Hawk— the accommodation-
ist tribal leader who sold out to the settler state and white traders.  After 
all, his oratory pres ents something that is often seen as a prob lem for 
literary and historical scholarship: the idea that agency can also mean 
the effort to keep  things  going as they are. But for Keokuk, maintain-
ing the status quo also meant a po liti cal voice within settler networks, 
and the continuation of a traditional economy based in re distribution 
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and the seasonal round, a social system that was closely embedded in 
Sauk cultural and po liti cal life, however difficult it proved to maintain. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that Keokuk got it “right.” His poli-
cies did not stave off further removal, he assented to treaties that signed 
away Sauk lands, and he took a side in the annuity debate that kept tribal 
funds out of reach from individual families. In this sense, the critique of 
Keokuk in Black Hawk’s Life of Mà- ka- tai- me- she- kià- kiàk logically in-
vites critical reflections along the tropes of re sis tance and accommoda-
tion, casting Black Hawk as the conquered warrior- hero and Keokuk as 
the opportunistic sycophant to whites. As Thomas Burnell Colbert re-
minds us, “Americans traditionally have focused their attention on Na-
tive American leaders who opposed federal officials through armed 
re sis tance, glamorizing ‘war chiefs’ who led brave but futile military ac-
tions against the United States.”79 Yet the conceptual clarity of Keokuk 
as a “puppet leader” at the behest of the United States government ob-
scures the critical work that his oratory also performed. Neither Black 
Hawk’s nor Keokuk’s publications can be fully understood outside the 
context of US- Indian diplomacy and its complex overlay of policy, trade, 
and indigenous critique— these  were the institutional contexts of Native 
writing and oratory. Critical attention to the ways indigenous writing 
was  shaped by the protocols and idiosyncrasies of Indian diplomacy  will 
help to understand the rhetorical and intellectual work of tribal leaders 
who operated in compromising colonial situations. As Matt Cohen 
writes, “Indigenous media worlds have always been multifaceted, mul-
tiformal, multimedia worlds of meaning- making,” and the publications 
of Black Hawk and Keokuk extended a long tradition of cross- cultural 
communication into new institutional domains.80  These compromising 
textual collaborations both critiqued and sustained a bureaucracy whose 
structural mismanagement exacerbated the fragile position of Indian na-
tions in a region that was undergoing dramatic change. Their critiques 
reflect the limited choices imposed by settler expansion and the treaty 
system, but to claim a place in the networks where policy was made and 
contested mattered then as it does  today. 
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